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Abstract—With the increasing penetration of inverter-based
distributed generators (DG) into low-voltage distribution micro-
grid systems, it is of great importance to guarantee their safe
and reliable operations. These systems leverage communication
networks to implement a distributed and cooperative control
structure. However, the detection of stealthy attacks with a
large impact and weak detection signals on such distributed
control systems is rarely studied. In this paper, we address
the problem of detecting a stealthy attack, named MaR, on
the communication network of a microgrid while an attacker
modifies the voltage measurement with the reference values.
We collect datasets from a hardware platform modeled after
a simplified microgrid and running the MaR attack performed
with a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) technique. We use the collected
datasets to compare different attack detection algorithms based
on multiple categories of machine learning algorithms. Our
results show that the Random Forest algorithm outperforms the
others to detect suspicious packets modified by a MitM attacker
with an accuracy close to 97%.
Index Terms—Microgrid, Security, Attack detection, Machine
learning, CPS systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Communication networks are playing an increasingly sig-
nificant role in guaranteeing reliable and safe operations of
the complex electrical power gird coordination [1]. However,
the extensive use of communication networks also introduces
cybersecurity vulnerabilities to the power systems, especially
with the growing adaption of distributed generators (DGs),
where more data is collected, transmitted, and processed
through communication networks.
Cyber attacks and their related detection issues have not
been extensively explored in the power distribution network
of a power grid [2–4]. Existing work mainly concentrates
on deception attacks against the physical layer of smart grid
systems. A typical deception attack is the false data injection
(FDI), which has been substantially studied in the literature.
As described in the distributed sparse attacks introduced in [5],
the FDI attack injects false data into the local measurements
of the phasor measurement units (PMUs) in a hierarchi-
cally structured network. The detection of an FDI attack is
usually based on state vector estimation (SVE), where the
detector gets the system state estimated from the observed
measurements and then computes the residual between the
observation and the estimation. If the residual is greater than
the given threshold, an FDI attack is detected [5, 6]. However,
it is challenging to accurately recover state vectors for SVE
in networks with sparse Jacobian measurement matrix [5].
Sparse reconstruction techniques can be an option to solve
this problem, however the sparsity of the state vectors restricts
its performance [5]. Moreover, there is a possibility that the
injected false data vectors could reside in the column space of
the sparse matrix and satisfy certain sparsity conditions, then
the FDI attacks, known as unobservable or stealthy attacks,
cannot be detected [6, 7].
Compared to the above traditional attack detection methods
based on threshold comparison, statistical learning algorithms
are able to detect not only observable but also unobservable
attacks [8]. The attack detection problem can be modeled with
machine learning techniques for statistical classification of
measurements. Specifically, the attack detection is a typical
two-classes (normal and abnormal) classification problem.
Supervised learning methods could be employed to design
attack detectors at the communication network level [9]. In [8],
experimental investigations prove that machine learning algo-
rithms outperform SVE-based methods in detection attacks for
smart grid systems. Besides, in the low-voltage distribution
microgrid case, there is no globally centralized estimation
system to dynamically measure and estimate the system states,
so traditional SVE based detection methods cannot be applied
directly.
In this work, we study attack detection for microgrids with a
distributed and cooperative control system. The control system
has a hierarchical structure including quadratic droop control
as primary control and distributed tracking control as sec-
ondary control. Distributed and cooperative control improves
the scalability and reliability of microgrids because of its better
support for a more substantial penetration of local loads and
DGs than traditional centralized control structure as considered
in [1] and [4]. Based on this distributed and cooperative control
model, a stealthy cyberattack named measurement as reference
attack (MaR) that targets the communication links connecting
each DG is considered. MaR attack can cause serious impact
like system voltage fluctuation and reference synchronization
errors, which is detailed in our previous work [10]. We build
an experimental microgrid platform with Raspberry Pi and
Arduino devices to realize a distributed and cooperative control
system. We implement the MaR stealthy attack using a Man-
in-the-Middle (MitM) technique and generate real datasets to
assess the attack detection mechanism. We design a simple
threshold comparison based attack detection method and also
apply five groups of supervised machine learning algorithms
(Bayesian Algorithms, Decision Tree Algorithms, Instance-
based Algorithms, Artificial Neural Network Algorithms, En-
semble Algorithms) to detect the stealthy attack. We com-
pare these different methods to identify the best performing
detection scheme. We find that Random Forest outperforms
the others to detect suspicious packets modified by a MitM
attacker. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
studying machine learning based detection methods for de-
tecting attack targeting distributed and cooperative controlled
microgrid systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents a distributed cooperative control model of micro-
grid and its associated threat model. Section III describes
the experiments that we carried to generate datasets from
an experimental microgrid platform. Section IV evaluate the
performance of both threshold based and machine learning
based attack detection methods. Finally, we conclude the paper
in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we describe a distributed and cooperative
control system of a microgrid and its threat model using the
measurement-as-reference (MaR) attack that we have designed
in [10].
A. Distributed cooperative control system
In our previous work [10], we propose a distributed co-
operative control scheme for microgrid voltage dynamics. As
shown in Fig. 1, the microgrid is composed of interconnected
DG units. Each DG unit consists of lumped inverter-based
distributed energy resources (DER) and loads. We assume that
there are N DG units in the considered microgrid and the DG
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Fig. 1: A distributed and cooperative microgrid control system
consisting of both primary and secondary controls. Interconnected
DG Units can exchange data with neighboring DG units through
sparse communication networks to transmit reference values and
measurement values (denoted by the superscript s) [10].
1) Communication network model: At the communication
level of the microgrid, each DG unit is considered as one
node of the communication graph and each communication
link is represented as an edge. The communication network
from Fig. 1 has a line topology. A generic microgrid network
topology can be denoted by a digraph G = (V, E , AG), with
a nonempty N -node finite set V = {v1, v2, . . . , vN}, a edge
set E ⊆ V × V , and an adjacency matrix AG. The set Ni =
{j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ E} represents the neighbor set of node i. aij
represents the weight for the edge connecting from node j to
node i. Note aij = 0 if no data transfers from node j to node
i. For a N -node digraph, the adjacency matrix AG = [aij ] ∈
RN×N .
Denote D = diag {di} ∈ RN×N as the diagonal in-degree
matrix of digraph G, where di =
∑
j∈Ni
aij is the sum of weights
from neighbors of node i. L = D − AG is defined as the
Laplacian matrix of digraph G. Note that the row sums of L
are all zero because D and AG have equal row sums.
2) Primary and secondary controllers: Inverter-based DG
units can be controlled by a droop controller [1]. By syn-
chronizing with its neighboring nodes and reading from local
meters, the droop controller of each DG unit obtains reference
values and voltage magnitude measurements. Denote V ∗ as
the reference value obtained from the secondary controller and
Vj as the voltage magnitude of the j-th DG unit. Note each
inverter-based DG unit can be modeled as a single integrator.
Applying the quadratic droop control developed in [11] to
calculate the voltage control output, we have the following
primary control law describing the voltage dynamics of each
DG:
τiV̇i(t) = −κiV ci (t)(V ci (t)− V c∗i (t))−Qci (t), (1)
where τi > 0 is the time-constant of the DG inverter,
κi > 0 is the droop control gain, V ci (t) is the received
voltage measurement, Qci (t) is the reactive power injection,
and V c∗i (t) is the received reference value obtained from the
secondary controller.
The aim of the secondary control is the generation and
synchronization of the reference signal V ∗. The microgrid
system depicted in Fig. 1 can be viewed as a multi-agent
system, so we develop the secondary control by applying the
distributed cooperative control of multi-agent systems [12].
In the communication digraph G, only the leader node gets
access to the reference instruction V ∗ from the secondary
controller by a weighted pinning gain gi. The pinning matrix
G = diag {gi} ∈ RN×N denotes all the pinning gains of the
digraph.
A tracking problem from the cooperative control theory is
applied to synchronize the reference values of DGs. The leader
node determines the consensus of all DG units synchronizing
to. Denote Vref = [V ∗1 . . . V
∗
N ]
> as the reference matrix
where V ∗i represents the reference setpoint for DG unit i. At
the steady state, the DGs reference synchronization holds as
follows:
V̇ref = −(L+G)(Vref − 1 · V ∗) (2)
Since L + G have positive real eigenvalues, the desired
tracking performance of equation (2) can be guaranteed when
the system dynamics get steady. The reference setpoint of DG
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B. Threat model
Without loss of generality, the attacker is assumed to target
the connection between DG unit i and unit i + 1. Since the
reference V ∗i+1 and the measurement of the previous node V
s
i
have very close values and similar dynamics, the attacker could
maliciously replace V ∗i+1 with V
s
i . This attack is naturally
stealthy, and it can cause a severe impact on the voltage control
stability as described in our previous work [10].
Measurement as reference (MaR) attack. By intercepting
the network connection between DG unit i and unit i + 1,
an attacker compromises the exchanged data, and maliciously
substitutes the reference signal V ∗i+1(t) for the voltage mea-
surement V si (t) , written as
V ∗i+1(t) = V
s
i (t), (4)
Additionally, the voltage dynamics of DG unit i + 1 under
MaR attack can be written as
τiV̇i+1(t) = −κi+1V ci+1(t)(V ci+1(t)− V si (t))−Qci+1(t) (5)
Multiple techniques could be used to realize this attack by
compromising the DG units or their communication links. In
this work we consider that the attacker employs a Man-in-the-
Middle (MitM) technique to compromise the communication
link between two DGs and replace the reference value with the
voltage measurement in a transparent way by acting as a proxy
which make the attack more difficult to detect. To facilitate the
analysis of the MaR attack, the Jacobian linearization of (1)
is computed at stable state (V̄ , V̄ c∗) where V̇i(t) = 0. x(t) =
V (t)− V̄ and u(t) = V c∗(t)− V̄ c∗ respectively represent the
voltage and reference deviations.
The analogous linearized system under MaR attack with a
MitM technique is described by
ẋ(t−∆t) = Ax(t−∆t) + τ−1i+1κi+1ei+1u(t−∆t)
yj(t−∆t) = e>j x(t−∆t)
u(t−∆t) = e>i x(t−∆t),
(6)
where A = −[τ ]−1([κ] + W ), [τ ] = diag
{






[κ1 . . . κN ]
>
}
and W is computed from Qci (t)
(as detailed in [4]), ei ∈ RN is the i-th column of the
N -dimensional identity matrix, and ∆t is the time delay
introduced due to the MitM attack. We can quantify the voltage
fluctuation caused by MaR attack by computing the deviation
of yj(t).
III. DATASETS COLLECTION METHODOLOGY
In this section, we detail our hardware platform [13] to
emulate a microgrid system with the distributed and coop-
erative control system depicted in Section II. In the built
hardware platform, we further implement a MitM attack to
fulfill the MaR attack described in Section II. We also collect
real datasets from the platform by running the attack and study
its detection algorithms.
A. Methodology
The main objective of our experimental platform is to create
a network connecting all DG units to transmit a voltage
instruction provided by a secondary controller. The DGs are
organized in a tree topology where the root DG gets the
instructions from the secondary controller and forwards them
to its connected DGs alongside its own voltage measurements.
This communication process acts between the nodes until
the transmitted information reaches the last node of the tree.
An intruder connects to the same network and runs a MitM
attack between two nodes. It aims to stealthily modify the
packets which go from the sender to the receiver to replace
the reference value with the measured voltage value.
As shown in Fig. 2, each DG is composed of one Raspberry
Pi and one Arduino board acting as the primary controller,
two motors A and B acting as a voltage generator, and one
lightbulb acting as an electrical load. The Raspberry Pi devices
are connected through a WiFi network and play the role
of the microgrid’s primary controllers. Each of them sends
instructions to the Arduino board through a USB port to
control the voltage generator by using a PI control algorithm.
The DC motor B is connected to DC motor A and generates
voltage to turn on the light bulb. The generated voltage will
power the light bulb, and its fluctuation affects the level of
brightness. We consider that the communications between DGs
are not encrypted and using the TCP protocol.
Fig. 2: The microgrid platform consisting of 4 DG units, where
each DG unit is composed of one Raspberry Pi, one Arduino board,
two motors and one light bulb to demonstrate the effect of voltage
instability on the level of brightness [13].
In order to give instructions from one DG to another, we
implement a server and a client on each of them. The server
obtains the instructions whereas the client gives them to the
next node in the tree. The client firstly connects to the server
on a specific port. It gets the current voltage measurement
from the local Arduino board through the serial port. Then a
new packet is created and sent to the server of the next node.
B. Attack implementation
For the system described in Fig. 1 and its experimental setup
depicted in Fig. 2, we implement our MaR attack that affects
the voltage stability and reference signal synchronization as
detailed in our previous study [10].
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Fig. 3: MaR attack implementation using the MitM technique.
In this scenario, we demonstrate the MaR attack when the
attacker uses a MitM technique to introduce itself between
two communicating DGs neighbors. As shown in Fig. 3, the
attacker introduces itself into a conversation between two DG
units and acts as relay/proxy, impersonates both nodes, and
gets access to the communication packets that the two nodes
are sending to each other. To inject a malicious instruction
into the network between two DGs, the attacker intercepts a
data packet, modifies it by replacing the reference value with
the voltage measurement and sends it to its destination.
C. Dataset description
We run the platform under two different scenarios: normal
operations without attack and under the MaR attack using
the MitM technique. For the two scenarios, we collect the
exchanged packets in the link between the DG 1 to DG 2 to
study the attack detection methods.
The linearized MaR attack model in Eq. (6) describes that
the attack can not only manipulate the reference and voltage
measurement values but also introduce a certain amount of
time delay, which helps us to select the features for statistical
machine learning. We use tcpdump tool to capture the packets
transmitted on the network and dissect them to extract five
features according to the model in Eq. (6): the packet latency,
the respective reference and measurement values of DG 1 to
DG 2. We compute the latency as the time difference between
sending and receiving timestamps of the same packet from
DG 1 to DG 2. We label each sample as normal (label 0)
when running the platform without attacks and abnormal (label
1) when the platform is running the MaR attack. A sample of
the collected dataset is shown in Fig. 4.
…
Fig. 4: A sample of captured data with 5 features and a class
label: packet latency, reference values ref dg1 and ref dg2,
measurement values mea dg1 and mea dg2, and class = 0 for
normal operations without attack and class = 1 for operations under
attack.
We collected 3036 samples in total, among which, 1991
samples are labeled as ”normal,” and 1045 samples are labeled
as ”attack”.
IV. ATTACK DETECTION
In this section, we study the detection problem of the MaR
attack modeled in Section II. We use datasets obtained from
the physical platform described in Section III to compare
traditional and supervised machine learning algorithms for the
MaR attack detection.
A. Performance metrics
In microgrid systems, we require the attack detection al-
gorithms to be capable to predict the label of a sample as
normal or abnormal with good performance to avoid false
alarms. Therefore, in our study and comparison of the different
algorithms, we measure four metrics named the true positives
(tp), the false positives (fp), the true negatives (tn), and the
false negatives (fn).
In addition, learning capabilities of the algorithms are
measured by the classical metrics which are: Precision Prec =
tp/(tp + fp), Recall Rec = tp/(tp + fn), and Accuracy
Acc = (tp+ tn)/(tp+ tn+ fp+ fn).
The precision metric describes the performance in predict-
ing positive samples, while the recall metric represents the
capability to identify all the positive samples. Finally, the
accuracy metric measures the total classification performance.
For example, if Prec = 1, no normal samples are misclassified
as abnormal, while if Rec = 1, no abnormal samples are
misclassified as normal. If Acc = 1, each sample classified
as abnormal is truly an attacked sample, and each sample
classified as normal is truly a secure measurement. We also
employ receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves to vi-
sually display the classification performance of each studied
algorithm by plotting the true positive rate (TPR) against the
false positive rate (FPR), where TPR = TP/(TP + FN),
and FPR = FP/(FP +TN). For each ROC curve, we iden-
tify its area under the curve (AUC) where the best classifiers
have the largest values.
B. Detection using threshold comparison
Threshold comparison based methods applied to SVE can-
not be deployed directly in the microgrid system described in
Section II, because there is no globally centralized estimation
system in the distribution network of power systems. However,
we can still utilize the same threshold comparison idea to
design a straightforward detection algorithm of our deliberate
attack. Since the voltage measurement value Vi and reference
value V ∗i at each DG follow the equation 1, we compute the
residue r = |Vi − V ∗i | and compare r with a certain threshold
δ, where δ > 0. If r ≥ δ, we consider that the system is under
attack.
As shown in Fig. 5, we observe that when the threshold
value δ is low, the attack detection achieves high recall and
low accuracy. When we increase δ, the recall decreases rapidly
and becomes close to 0 when δ = 1.2V , and the accuracy












Fig. 5: Performance metrics of the threshold comparison method.
gets higher gradually. Overall, the precision of this detection
algorithm is very low (lower than 0.4). Fig. 6 depicts the ROC
curve of this detection method where the true positive rate and
the false positive rate are computed under different thresholds.
We observe that the performance of a classifier based on this
method is quite bad and it is not better than random.











Fig. 6: ROC curve of a classifier based on threshold comparison
applied to detect the MaR attack.
C. Detection using supervised machine learning algorithms
The attack detection problem can be considered as a typical
supervised machine learning classification problem that returns
the corresponding labels of communication packets exchanged
between two DGs. According to the system described in
equations (6) and (3), we choose five features to be used by
the ML algorithms as input: the delay latency, the two volt-
age measurement values mea dg1 and mea dg2at DGi and
DGi+1 and the two reference values ref dg1 and ref dg2
at DGi and DGi+1, as shown in Fig. 4.
In order to comprehensively study how statistic learning
algorithms perform in our attack detection problem, we should
cover most of the popular individual supervised learning
methods. Moreover, in statistical learning theory, it is usually
difficult to find one rule or one feature set which outperforms
other rules or features of individual classification methods,
so we also need to study ensemble learning, which combines
a collection of classifiers to solve this problem. Therefore,
we adopt seven different machine learning algorithms [14]
grouped into five categories:
• Bayesian Algorithms: Naive Bayes classifier assumes that
all the feature values are independent with each other in
terms of the class variable.
• Decision Tree Algorithms: Decision Tree is a flowchart-
like structure where each internal node denotes a test on
a data attribute, each branch denotes the outcome of the
test, and each leaf node denotes a class prediction.
• Instance-based Algorithms: k-Nearest Neighbor (KNN)
finds k samples in training data that are closest to the test
sample and assigns the most frequent label among these
samples to the new sample. Support-Vector Machine
(SVM) constructs a hyperplane or set of hyperplanes in
a high-dimensional space for classification.
• Artificial Neural Network Algorithms: Multilayer Per-
ceptrons (MLP) optimizes the weights for the activation
function of neurons organized in a network architecture.
• Ensemble Algorithms: AdaBoost combines ”weak classi-
fiers” into a single ”strong classifier”. Random Forest is a
meta estimator using a number of decision tree classifiers
on various sub-samples of the dataset and averaging them
to improve its predictive accuracy.
Table I provides the optimal parameters that we identified
for the classification of our datasets using the scikit-learn
implementation of these machine learning algorithms.
TABLE I: Parameters of the adopted machine learning algorithms.
Detection algorithm Parameters
Ada Boost DecisionTree estimator with max depth=20,number of estimators=30, learning rate=0.1
Decision Tree max depth=20
KNN number of neighbors=10, metric=’cosine’
Multi Layer Perceptron number of neurons=100, L2 penalty=1,max iter=1000
Naive Bayes default parameters
Random Forest number of trees=30, max depth=20,max features=3
SVC Linear kernel=’linear’, regularization parameter=1.0
SVC polynomial kernel=’poly’, degree=2, gamma=’auto’,regularization parameter=1.0
SVC RBF kernel=’rbf’, gamma=’auto’,regularization parameter=1.0
The ROC curves of the selected machine learning algorithm
are shown in Fig. 7. We observe that Random Forest has
an AUC = 0.99, which is more significant than any other
algorithms. It means that it has a 99% chance that the model
will be capable of distinguishing between positive class and
negative class.
We see more details of the performance of the differ-
ent machine learning algorithms compared to the threshold
method in Table II. We find that Naive Bayes has a relatively
worse performance in terms of three metrics, which shows
the features we choose are not independent with each other.
Fig. 7: ROC curves of the different machine learning algorithms.
SVM has the best performance in terms of precision; however,
Random Forest has the best performance in terms of recall and
accuracy. As a result, we find that a detection method based
on Random Forest has the best performance.
TABLE II: Performance of the different attack detection algorithms.
Detection algorithm Precision Recall Accuracy
Threshold Comparison (δ = 0.3) 0.39 0.32 0.53
Ada Boost 0.93 0.94 0.96
Decision Tree 0.93 0.94 0.95
KNN 0.99 0.88 0.96
Multi Layer Perceptron 0.97 0.87 0.95
Naive Bayes 0.79 0.72 0.83
Random Forest 0.96 0.95 0.97
SVC Linear 0.74 0.85 0.8
SVC polynomial 1.00 0.85 0.95
SVC RBF 1.00 0.82 0.94
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we study the attack detection of the mea-
surement as reference attack targeting communication links
of microgrid systems with a distributed cooperative control
structure. We collect datasets from an experimental micro-
grid platform running this attack. We study both the classic
threshold comparison detection method and various supervised
machine learning algorithms to compare their performance.
We find that Random Forest based method has the best
performance to detect such attacks. As future work, we will
design and implement faults in our experimental platform to
verify the performance of machine learning and even deep
learning algorithms to identify attacks, normal and faulty
behaviors.
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